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A Life Below the Threshold? Examining Conflict Between Ethical Principles and 
Parental Values in Neonatal Treatment Decision Making 
 
There is often a lot of talk about families in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). In 
particular, there is often a lot of talk about mommas. There is talk about good mommas and bad 
mommas. We talk about mommas who are “around” and mommas who “don’t show up.” We 
talk about mommas who breast feed or pump and mommas who do not. And we talk about 
mommas who test positive from drug use, mommas who are also sick and in the hospital, 
mommas who have been abused, and mommas whose children are in protective custody. 
In cases where a mother does not seem to be making good medical decisions for her 
child, providers will often talk about changing this. They will involve ancillary support staff, 
such as social workers or clinical ethicists. They will have care conferences with families. In 
some cases, they will take the more extreme approach of arguing that the child is a victim of 
medical neglect because his family refuses treatment options that will help him. 
In pediatrics, the latter approach has been analyzed by Douglas Diekema, among others, 
who argues that the right justification for overriding parental authority for medical decision 
making requires determining that the child will be harmed by parental decisions, which he calls 
the harm principle. If all of the following eight conditions are met, then a state may justifiably 
interfere with parental decision-making: 
1. Refusal to consent to a proposed intervention places the child at significant risk of 
harm; 
2. The harm from refusal is imminent; 
3. The refused intervention has been proven necessary to prevent the harm; 
4. The refused intervention has proven efficacy; 
5. The risk of harm from the refused intervention is less than the risk of harm from 
non-intervention, and the benefits of intervention outweigh the burdens of 
intervention; 
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6. There is no other option for preventing the harm that is less intrusive to parental 
authority;  
7. The state intervention could be generalized to all other similar situations; 
8. Most parents would agree that the state intervention was reasonable (Diekema 2004, 
252).  
According to Diekema, these conditions are an improvement over other ethical standards for 
limiting parental authority in medical decision making because they accurately capture how 
medical professionals already operate. Anecdotally, many providers in pediatrics seem 
concerned with whether parents’ choices are likely to harm their patients, not with whether 
parents’ choices are likely to do what is in a patient’s best interests. 
 Yet, it is important to note that the harm principle has its limitations. In theory, the harm 
principle, and the related principle of best interest (Brock and Buchanan 1989), justify 
intervention to protect a child under certain circumstances. But in practice it is often unclear 
how to fairly determine whether potential treatments are more likely to harm a child than non-
treatment. Likewise, it is difficult to establish whose interests should be balanced when 
considering what is in a child's "best interests" (Hester 2007). Thus, in cases where parents seem 
to be making poor choices for sick children, we are often left to muddle along, striving, at our 
best, to construct a story for ourselves that makes sense of our participation in the parents' poor 
choices or justifies our extraordinary intervention to curtail their authority. What follows is one 
such story from the field, told as a clinical ethicist tries to make sense of the frustration and 
anguish felt by health care providers while also making sense of a particular parent’s rights.  
 
David & Esme 
 
 David Espanoza was born at 25 weeks’ gestational age, with common complications 
from prematurity and very low birth weight, including chronic lung disease and a Grade III 
intraventricular hemorrhage.  Prior to delivery, David's 14 year old mother, Esme, and 21 year 
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old father, Jaime, were living with Esme's grandparents in a rural city in the central southern 
US. After delivery, David was transferred to a University Hospital NICU, where hospital staff 
soon learned of Esme and Jaime's ages. Jaime was reported for sex with a minor and was 
incarcerated thereafter to await court proceedings on the charge of rape. Though they too were 
reported for neglect and child endangerment, Esme was returned to her parents' home after 
discharge. 
 Two weeks into his hospitalization, David suffered what was diagnosed as a 
spontaneous intestinal perforation, but may have been necrotizing enterocolitis, which did not 
respond to drainage and had to be surgically repaired. Although they successfully removed 
much of his intestines, surgeons could not close his incision, which developed a fungal 
infection. With his ongoing intestinal problems, NICU physicians called a family meeting 
because they believed David had a small chance of surviving this hospitalization. They told 
Esme that if he did survive, he faced a poor quality of life and many additional health problems. 
She wanted everything done for him and asked when he was going to be okay. She could not 
wait until he could come home because she was planning a pizza party for him with games and 
prizes. 
 Following the family meeting, David was weaned off of ventilator support, received 
total parenteral nutrition, and developed Grades III and IV retinopathy of prematurity. He then 
suffered an obstructed bowel that led him to vomit stool for multiple days. Although some 
members of the medical team believed David’s prognosis was exceedingly poor, surgeons were 
consulted and offered a more optimistic assessment, including the possibility of surgical repair 
of the obstruction, yet with the caveat that it would not affect his long term prognosis because it 
would not improve his short gut syndrome. Nevertheless, Esme consented to surgery. After 
surgery David decompensated, exhibiting respiratory distress and requiring re-intubation.  
 At the present moment, Esme just wants David to get better, to have him home with her. 
She has spoken to his bedside nurse daily and visited often. But she has not been able to stay 
overnight because hospital policy requires individuals under 18 years old be supervised by a 
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responsible adult in the waiting room or when rooming in. Both of Esme's parents work so they 
cannot supervise her, and she does not know any other responsible adults. 
 When she has visited, Esme and her mother have met routinely with pastoral care 
services and developed a strong rapport with one of the NICU Chaplains. They are faithful 
Catholics. Every time David reaches a clinical milestone physicians said he was not likely to 
reach, they say it is a miracle. And they believe he will continue to make a miraculous recovery, 
no matter what the doctors say. 
 According to the NICU Chaplain, the family communicates well and "realizes the 
realities of the situation". However, he also thinks the family is not focusing enough on David’s 
best interests. He believes they are concerned solely with whether David will continue to 
survive, rather than what quality of life he might have over time. He says this is consistent with 
their Catholicism but he believes their beliefs would also allow them to consider David's quality 
of life and the idea of redirecting care toward a comfortable death. But, he says, "they are not 
there yet." 
 Since she reported David's father to law enforcement, the primary social worker 
involved says the family has become so evasive when she approaches them that another social 
worker was temporarily appointed to advocate for them in past family meetings. She believes 
we are only prolonging David's inevitable death and that as he gets older his life will only 
become worse. 
 David's bedside nurse knows that Esme listens to her daily reports, but since she always 
interrupts or asks unrelated questions, the nurse believes Esme does not fully understand the 
severity of his prognosis. Although his nurse has told Esme repeatedly about the severity of his 
many medical problems, Esme keeps asking when David will open his eyes and recognize her, 
and when she can hold him and feed him. David's nurse is so overcome with sadness from 
caring for him that she says she will remember it for the rest of her life. One day, when 
changing the bandage on his open, infected abdominal incision, she literally retched, not 
because of disgust, but because of her profound sadness at his fate. She thinks we are not doing 
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any favors for David. He will never live a good life. And if Esme cannot see that, it is because 
she is not looking. 
 David's primary physicians predict that if he survives the current hospitalization he will 
be dependent on TPN forever. Eventually, he will develop untreatable liver failure and die. 
They are frustrated and tired of talking to Esme and her mother about goals of care. Esme 
knows his prognosis, but she remains committed to aggressive treatment. Although they are 
committed to providing care consistent with Esme's wishes, they wonder how it can be good for 
David to sustain his health longer and longer until he is so sick he finally dies despite heroic 
interventions. They also wonder how it is even possible to think that what may be 'best' for this 
boy would be to comfort him while he dies. And, finally, they wonder whether, in the event 
that his condition worsens to the point that further treatment would be futile, they can overrule 
Esme's wishes to continue aggressive treatment. 
 At the time of this writing, David remains alive and his case remains open. Caring for 
him has become an exercise in tolerance and restraint for those who are closest to him. His life 
embodies the dilemmas that arise when we, as individuals and as a society, strive to balance 
mutually exclusive values like prioritizing sanctity of life versus quality of life.  
 
A Life Below the Threshold? 
 
 Given what I learned about David, my initial response was to conceptualize his 
predicament in terms of obligations the state and hospital have for protecting him from harms. I 
also recognized it was important to think about his best interests. As I reflected on his case I 
realized that in his circumstances the harm principle and best interest frameworks come into 
conflict. I also discovered that the specific ethical issue that prompted my involvement—
whether David’s neonatologists would be justified in overriding Esme’s wishes for continued 
aggressive treatment—is one that is poorly understood in the medical ethics literature. 
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 The harm principle is designed to justify state intervention in the case where, presented 
with treatment options, one or more parent chooses an action likely to harm a child. In David's 
case, some healthcare providers believe Esme’s decisions are causing him prolonged harm. His 
bedside nurse thinks we are prolonging his life in a way that does him no favors. His primary 
physicians think he is doomed to have multiple complications over the course of what they 
predict will be a brief, unpleasant life. For these people, choosing medical interventions that 
further his life is to harm him, and to continue to harm him day after day, after day. 
 Yet, although the harm principle appears applicable to David’s case, I have come to 
believe it is not. The harm principle is designed to evaluate whether a state is justified in 
intervening in a parent’s decision to refuse treatment. It this circumstance, a parent consents to 
treatment offered that may harm her child. Thus, as I attempted to apply the harm principle to 
David's circumstances, I discovered that since Esme is not refusing treatment, whatever harms 
come from her choice are not harms that come from refusal. Consequently, the harm principle 
does not apply. 
 Having rejected the harm principle in this case, I then sought other conceptual 
frameworks to aid me in thinking through its moral geography. One way to conceptualize 
David’s situation is in terms of the best interest standard (or principle), thinking strictly about 
David’s interests alone and how they might be met by continued aggressive treatment versus 
redirecting to comfort care. This is to think of what is best for David in terms of an individualistic 
interpretation of the best interest principle (Salter 2012). So understood, whether David’s 
interests are met by either treatment pathway initially appeared to me to hang on how poor his 
prognoses were on the different pathways and how certain clinicians’ were of their 
prognostications. David’s neonatologists were fairly certain that treated aggressively he would 
be TPN dependent because of his short gut syndrome, which may lead to life threatening 
complications including liver failure and sepsis (Basem et al 2012). They were also certain that if 
he received comfort care he would die in days or weeks. Thus, David’s prognoses were either a 
prolonged course of medical intervention that may ultimately lead to his death or a short course 
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of medical intervention that would certainly lead to his death. There was also some uncertainty 
regarding whether he might eventually be healthy enough with aggressive treatment to tolerate 
feeding and overcome his predicted TPN dependency, which would improve his outcomes but 
still leave him at risk for significant, long term complications (Peyret et al 2011). 
 As an ethicist, I recognized that the question of which of these two pathways is in 
David’s best interests is not one I was in a position to answer. It is up to the individuals with 
decision-making authority to decide what is best for him, which in this case would have been 
his mother. While I knew that in Esme's view what was best for him was to continue living, I 
nevertheless wondered whether this might be incorrect. I wondered whether it would be best 
for David to no longer live.  
 To examine this possibility, I wondered about the burdens of living a life with fewer 
cognitive and motor abilities than children who develop normally. There is scant literature on a 
child with David’s particular complement of comorbidities. What is known suggested to me 
that his prognosis was radically uncertain, a circumstance where uncertainty regarding future 
outcomes, evidence for prognostication, the complexity of risk information, and ignorance 
converge such that it is unclear how to approach ethical medical decision making (Politi et al 
2007). While many children with his neurological condition do well, some experience significant 
neurological abnormalities (Bolisetty et al 2014). Likewise, while some children who develop 
short gut syndrome and related complications do poorly, others fair well. Additionally, some 
research suggests that health care providers are more inclined to promote allowing children like 
David to die than older children with comparable disease burdens (Marcello et al 2011). 
Given these uncertainties, I imagined a range of possibilities for David. And no matter 
how reduced I imagined David’s capabilities, I kept thinking to myself that even if he were to 
be totally dependent on Esme for care, and even if she provided rather poor care for him, and 
even if he was extraordinarily minimally aware of his experiences in the world, it is not clear 
that such a life would be worse than not living at all. Rather, it was quite possible that David 
might not be capable of appreciating his pain, were he to have it. It was also possible he might 
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not be capable of appreciating his pleasure. It was also possible that he might develop the 
capacity to appreciate both his pain and pleasure. Furthermore, even if he could, and he felt 
pain disproportionately more often than pleasure—and even if that pleasure was both slight 
and the height of his life’s achievements—it was not clear to me that for David, irrespective of 
anyone else’s evaluation of his interests, to experience this was, taken altogether, worse than not 
living at all. Indeed, to die is to cease having interests and to be in a state where any and all 
interests one had before death are no longer attainable. So it was not clear to me how, for David, 
it could be in his best interests to be in a state where he no longer has interests. Irrespective of 
what it means to estimate what is in someone’s best interests, presumably having interests at all 
is better than having no interests. While it is plausible that David’s injuries would result in him 
having interests in only the most basic comforts, like nutrition, warmth, and lack of pain, these 
are nevertheless interests. If David were to die, then we would have no interests and no 
preferences, as he would no longer exist in the state of being alive, which is a precondition for 
having interests and preferences. 
Thus, I realized I do not know what it means to say that from David’s own subjective 
point of view his life is not worth living at all in an individualistic sense of the best interest 
standard. If it is possible to make such an assessment, then in David’s case doing so seems 
equivalent to rational suicide, but for a patient for whom rationality is not possible, as he has 
not attained the ability to make rational decisions.  
From this reasoning I have come to believe that for cases like David's, where decisions 
must be made for a neonate with an uncertain prognosis and for whom a poor prognosis is 
appreciable, the individualistic best interest standard is a useless fiction that should be avoided. 
It is not possible to say with conviction what would be literally best for David, as though his 
interests were separable from others’ interests. This conclusion is personally unsatisfying 
because I also believe that if a child is so significantly injured that they will never meaningfully 
interact with the world, then it is morally permissible to love, support, and comfort them while 
they die of their injuries without heroic intervention. But, in this case I felt that appealing to a 
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canonical understanding of best interests would not justify even this view, much less the view 
that it is morally permissible to choose comfort care for a child who has some chance of living a 
life with moderate to severe disability. So, I investigated other ways to justify allowing David to 
die.  
I next considered whether a relational interpretation of best interests would alter the 
moral assessment of David's circumstances. On this view, David's current and future interests 
are not all that matters; the principle also guides us to consider the interests of his family 
members and others (Salter 2012). As Esme’s parents both worked and David’s father was likely 
to be incarcerated, it seemed probable she would be his primary (and perhaps sole) caretaker. 
As a 14 year old girl, I could imagine it was not in her interests for David to continue living. 
Examining this further revealed that to imagine this is to see the rest of Esme’s life sadly, as a 
child, and eventually a woman, whose opportunities are significantly diminished as she 
continually meets her caretaking obligations. Not only would she no longer have the 
opportunity to flourish in her own childhood, but she would also sacrifice her adulthood for his 
life. However, one need not envision Esme’s life so sadly. David might do poorly, yet serve as 
an inspiration for her self-improvement and exemplary motherhood. He might do poorly, yet 
Esme might receive ample and adequate support from community and government programs 
designed specifically to aid her development. Or, David might do wonderfully, reaching 
developmental milestones that surpass doctors' prognoses, and they might create a complex, 
loving, and fulfilling family.  
Since these and other possibilities were open, it was not clear to me how to construct 
David's best interest on the relational view. Instead, the relational view added additional 
uncertainty and complexity as I attempted to project possible familial outcomes from the range 
of prognostic possibilities still open to David. So, I instead considered how Esme’s beliefs and 
values as related to David’s circumstances and whether they could serve as guides for decision 
making. For example, if Esme believed that because of his prognosis David's continued life 
would be worse for him than his death, then it would be morally permissible to accept her 
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assessment, and consequently, to conclude that continued life was not in his best interests. So, 
on the relational view if Esme thought that because of the sort of circumstances David would 
experience in their family it would be worse for him to continue living, then it would be 
permissible to accept her assessment. But, of course, Esme did not believe this. Her view was 
that life is intrinsically valuable, and thus, that what was best for David was continued life, 
regardless of its "quality."  Esme's view appeared akin to medical vitalism (Mayo and 
Gunderson 2002) and therefore to be inconsistent even with the concept of evaluating life for its 
quality.  
Knowing Esme’s medical vitalism, I found it difficult to reason that on a relational best 
interest view it would be better for David to die in comfort than to undergo continued 
aggressive care with an uncertain prognosis. I appreciated that Esme’s beliefs might be 
immature, underdeveloped, or cover for concern with the social or familial consequences she 
would face if she allowed him to die, rather than her well-founded beliefs. But despite this, I 
came to conclude that on the relational view of best interest it also remained in David's best 
interests to continue aggressive treatment. I believed I had given Esme opportunities to be more 
explicit about her values up to the point of becoming problematically directive in my 
conversations with her and her family. At no point had she stated any other overriding 
concerns than that she wanted whatever medical treatment was going to continue David’s life 
and chance of recovery, no matter how remote or negligible.  
 As a clinical ethicist, at this point I had a feeling that may be familiar to others: I felt a 
discomfort arising from my perception that I knew what was morally right in the case but that I 
could not justify it, and in fact, could only justify its contrary. And so I tried harder. I realized 
that just like the harm principle, in the case of pediatric decision making the best interest 
principle is really designed as a means for limiting parental authority when parents seek to 
refuse treatment rather than when they choose further treatment that has been offered to their 
child. As Kopelman (2005) has argued, the best interests principle is a negative principle: it serves 
to limit parents’ choices rather than to guide them toward exemplary decision making.  
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 On this reasoning, my next step was to consider whether looking away from the best 
interest and harm principles would shed new light on the problem. I discovered that Wilkinson 
has recently given an updated argument for on old and intuitive position, which he calls the 
threshold view. In a nutshell, his position is that there is a group of neonates for whom life 
sustaining treatment is not obligatory. For this group it is morally permissible for parents or 
physicians to decide not to offer or to withdraw life sustaining treatments. The quality that 
defines membership into this group of neonates is that of being "a critically ill newborn infant 
[that] is predicted to have severe and irremediable impairment, such that they will not be able 
to take part in and realize many of the good features of life" (Wilkinson 2001, 21). What makes 
this view a "threshold view" is that it works by positing two thresholds. At one threshold, we 
are to imagine that below it a developing neonate and future child has at all times a life that is 
"not worth living" because the benefits of continued life do not outweigh the burdens of 
continued life. At another threshold, we are to imagine that above it a developing neonate and 
future child has at all times a life that is "worth living" because the benefits of continued life 
outweigh the burdens. In Wilkinson's terms, at one threshold lives have "negative net future 
well being" and at the other threshold they have "positive net future well being" (ibid.) On the 
threshold view, there is a moral middle space between these two thresholds, which is filled by 
children with significant injuries, and thus for whom there is significant uncertainty about 
whether they will ultimately have positive or negative net future well being. According to 
Wilkinson, it is in this space that life sustaining treatment is morally permissible but not 
obligatory. What Wilkinson does not state is who is vested with the authority to determine 
which category a neonate fits into; his account provides no practical suggestion for how it might 
be operationalized on the wards. 
 Nevertheless, Wilkinson's view appeared perfectly suited to my felt need to justify the 
permissibility of allowing David to die while comforting him. And in a sense, it was. Granting 
contentious assumptions made by Wilkinson other authors dispute (e.g. Silver and Francis 
2011), it is reasonable to say that David's diagnosis and prognosis place him in the 'middle 
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space'. It then follows that removing life sustaining treatment would be permissible, yet also 
would continuing it.  
 However, I recalled that the question I had been asked to weigh in on was whether 
David's neonatologists would be justified in removing life sustaining treatments despite Esme's 
choices; and, if not, if they would be able to limit the treatment options they offered to Esme in 
the future, if his condition worsened as they expected. On this question, Wilkinson's view was 
clear but ultimately unhelpful. Wilkinson argues it is impermissible to continue to treat infants 
who fall sufficiently below the threshold of negative net future well being, and thus, in such a 
case, a physician is obligated to allow a child to die while comforting and supporting him, 
regardless of parents' wishes: 
"Treatment continuation is not permissible for infants with conditions that: 
[1] Reduce future well-being, either by reducing benefits or by imposing substantial 
burdens on the child (or both). 
AND 
[2] Render it highly likely that the infant will have [a life not worth living] and be 
harmed by continuing treatment" (Wilkinson 2011, 27) 
Through Wilkinson's account, I came to believe that David's neonatologists believed something 
like the threshold view, or at least that they perceived it as a moral possibility that they wanted 
me to evaluate. It was not that they felt it was best for David to no longer live in the sense of the 
term "best" as it occurs in "best interests." It was also not that they felt Esme was making choices 
that would cause David continual harm. Rather, the most adequate reconstruction of their 
concern I could come up with was that they felt David was likely to have a life not worth living, 
meaning that his injuries and prolonged medical intervention would cause him substantial 
burdens with negligible or no benefits. 
 However, I came to believe that although Wilkinson's analysis is an apt reconstruction of 
their view and of my own intuitions, it is ultimately unpersuasive in David's case. When used to 
understand David’s circumstances, I found that the crucial problem with the threshold view is 
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that it presupposed and priortized a quasi-objective means for assessing whether a life is not worth living. 
Even if David's diagnosis and prognosis entailed that his was a life with negative net future 
well being, it would have been deeply problematic to alter his treatment based on this 
assessment, because to do so would be to strip Esme of a primary privilege of parenthood, the 
privilege to determine what, under the circumstances, is right and good for her child. In effect, 
to adopt the threshold view would have been to override and forsake Esme's values—her 
commitment to medical vitalism—in order to prioritize an alternative value system, one that 
sees life as a qualified good, with different gradations.  
 I realized that there were those who did not believe Esme to be acting in good faith 
when making medical decisions for David. At least one member of the medical team who was 
not primarily involved in his care questioned whether she was the right person to make 
decisions because she was not adequately focusing on the gravity of his situation, and was 
instead focusing on activities like planning a pizza party for him. To them, it seemed that Esme 
was in denial, immature, and lacked the cognitive ability to adequately think through the 
decisions David faced. On this view, what would be best for David would be to replace Esme 
with another decision maker, such as a court appointed guardian or grand parent. However, in 
the state in which this case occurred, a woman has the legal right to make health care decisions 
for her child, once born, regardless of her age. In that state, a 14-year-old girl has the same legal 
standing with regard to parental decision making as a mother of any other age. The law does 
not discriminate parental decision-making authority based on age, nor on competency. Rather, 
it allows for contesting decision-making authority if and only if the parent has harmed (or 
perhaps is likely to harm) a child. Thus, while in other states granting another person with 
temporary power to make decisions for David may have been an option, in his actual locale, it 
would have required first demonstrating harm, and thus, required the sort of reasoning 
displayed by Diekema’s harm principle rather than the best interest principle or the threshold 
view. As discussed above, I found this strategy unworkable. 
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 Personally, I find the threshold view compelling. I believe that were my family to face a 
choice of whether to continue aggressive treatment for our child who existed in the moral 
middle ground, the view would help me understand our predicament. And it would help me 
understand how it might be defensible to allow my baby to die in comfort despite the possibility 
that he could live and perhaps even live with moderate disability. However, projecting my own 
beliefs was not at issue in David's case. Furthermore, I have not faced the decisions Esme faces. 
Esme's views seem deeply inconsistent with the threshold view. Consequently, in her case 
while the view was helpful for conceptualizing the issues, in the end it fails to justify 
interventions to curtail her authority because to do so would be to unjustifiably supersede her 
privilege as David’s mother. 
 In the end, consulting on David's case reminded me that values lie within our cherished 
ethical principles, even after they are rarified through years of analyses. A basic value underlying the 
threshold view is that life is a qualified good. This value also underlies at least some 
interpretations of the best interest standard, though it is not implicit in the harm principle. In 
this case, reasoning through the fit between these ethical positions and the case helped to 
understand what was at issue, and in the end, what was the least worst option.  
 I remain troubled by the case, though, because I suspect Esme has not carefully 
considered her values or the implications of her choices. I remain concerned that Esme has a 
basic disposition to value life that has not survived personal reflection and scrutiny. I believe 
that when facing choices of such importance as those she has faced in the NICU, one should be 
reflective, thoughtful, and considerate. So I remain concerned that she is not making decisions 
well. 
 Furthermore, I am troubled by the experience of muddling through clinical uncertainty, 
where seasoned providers expressed strong convictions that this child faced a high chance of a 
terribly unsatisfying, significantly disabled life, and moreover, that this was a compelling 
reasons to focus on his comfortable death. While I concur with the view that parents ought to be 
vested with the authority to determine whether to withhold treatments from children with a 
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sufficient likelihood of an extremely poor prognosis, I find it troubling that in practice 
constructing sound argument based on meaningfully certain knowledge relating to the 
preceding terms, “high chance,” “significantly disabled,” and “extremely poor prognosis,” is a 
challenging and fraught endeavor. Even if there are moments where these terms become clear 
in the muddle, I believe it is inappropriate to privilege providers’ assessments of the 
appropriate goals of care over parents. 
 However, as the above discussion has revealed, I appreciate the cultural and moral 
pluralism of our society and of the health care environment. People are free to make poor 
choices, just so long as they do not present a danger to others. In this case, perhaps Esme 
disvalues thoughtful, careful, reflective decision making. If so, then it is not clear I must compel 
her to make decisions in the way that I believe she ought to. Thus, in the end, I am left to rest 
the issue with her choices, and in this way, the rest of the NICU team and I are left to provide 
the care for David that is most consistent with her wants. And I wonder, isn't this how it should 
be?  
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Discussion Questions 
 
1) How should the ethicist think through the relationship between apparently competing 
bioethical views in particular clinical circumstances?  
 
2) Should there be a competency evaluation for parents, guardians, surrogates, or other proxy 
medical decision makers? 
 
3) Should society develop policies to limit health care in circumstances where there is an 
appreciable likelihood of extremely poor outcomes. 
